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Less Privacy Please, We're British:
Investigating Crime with DNA in the
U.K. and the U.S.
By DUNCAN CARLING*

I. Introduction
DNA evidence is having an enormous impact on our criminal
justice system. Police are now able to compare traces of DNA left at
a crime scene against a national database of offenders, which often
allows police to solve crimes for which they had no other leads. As of
July 2007, the FBI's National DNA Index System (NDIS) has aided
over 52,800 investigations, thereby preventing an incalculable number
of additional crimes.' DNA evidence is also freeing many people who
were in prison for crimes they did not commit. Post-conviction tests
have exonerated 207 people in the United States so far, fifteen of
whom were awaiting the death penalty. 2 But although DNA
technology is now a well-established investigative tool, legal issues
continue to arise.
The United States and Great Britain are the world leaders in the
use of DNA databases for criminal investigations. The British started
using a national database in 1995, while the U.S. database became
operational in 1998.' The law in this area is evolving differently in
J.D. Candidate, May 2008, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
1. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Combined DNA Index System (CODIS)
Home Page, Investigations Aided, <www.fbi.gov/ hq/lab/codis/aidedmap.htm>
(visited Oct. 1, 2007).
2. The Innocence Project, <www.innocenceproject.com/know> (visited Oct. 1,
2007).
3. Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, The National DNA
Database, February 2006, <www.parliament.uk/ documents/upload/postpn258.pdf>
(visited Oct. 1, 2007); Federal Bureau of Investigation, Combined DNA Index System
(CODIS) Home Page, Mission Statement and Background, <www.fbi.gov/
hqlab/codis/program.htm> (visited Oct. 1, 2007).
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each country, however. For example, the British police are allowed
to collect samples from a much wider range of people, and are
authorized to use the data in ways that are not permitted in the
United States.
This note will compare the differences between the American
and British DNA database programs, and discuss how these
differences came about. The first section will briefly review the
nature of a criminal DNA database. This field is an intersection of
biology, software, and law; this note will discuss the bare minimum of
science necessary to clarify the legal issues that follow. The second
section will review the differences between the United States. and
United Kingdom programs. It will review how the legislation differs,
and discuss two notable differences in practice: the collection of DNA
from people who have been arrested but not convicted, and the
technique of looking for an offender's relatives in the database. The
final section will offer an explanation as to why these differences have
arisen. Our respective constitutional frameworks provide only part of
the explanation; our disparate cultural views on privacy are equally
significant in shaping these national programs.
H. An Overview of DNA Databases
A. DNA Evidence
DNA is a molecule composed of deoxyribonucleic acid and
found in the nucleus of almost every cell in the human body.4 We
inherit half of it from our father and half from our mother, and it
carries our human genetic information.5 DNA defines many of our
physical characteristics and possibly our propensity for certain kinds
of behavior.6
The entirety of genetic content contained in our DNA is called
the human genome. Ninety-eight percent of the data is the same for
every human, but the remaining two percent is unique to each
individual.7 In the 1990s, scientists made significant advancements in
4. Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, supra note 3.
5. Id.
6. Electronic Privacy Information Center, Genetic Privacy, <www.epic.org/
privacy/genetic/> (visited Oct. 1, 2007).
7. Fredrick Bieber, Science and Technology of Forensic DNA Profiling: Current
Use and Future Directions, in DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 26 (David
Lazer ed., 2004).
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their understanding of the human genome. Now we are aware of
specific regions in the genome which can be accurately used as
personal identifiers, analogous in some ways to a fingerprint.
These locations in the genome, called loci, function as markers
where genetic samples can be compared against each other. At these
markers we have DNA sequences called alleles.8 Because people
inherit genetic variations, the length or sequence of a person's alleles
at these markers will vary. The specific length or sequence of an
allele is represented by a number, and these numbers are stored in
databases for comparisons.9 When investigators compare DNA
samples from a crime scene against a database, they are comparing
numbers that represent the alleles present at these markers. °
The significance of a match depends in part on how many
markers are being compared. The FBI compares alleles at thirteen
markers," while the British police make comparisons at ten. 2 But the
significance of a match also depends on how common, or rare, the
alleles at those markers are. When the alleles in the profile are rare,
the significance of a match is much higher. 3 If the alleles in a profile
are common, the significance of the match can be strengthened by
comparing alleles at more markers. The chance of two unrelated
people sharing a common allele at a single marker might be one in
ten, but the chance of them sharing uncommon alleles at 16 markers
could be one in 700 quintillion or less. 4
For the purposes of this note, there are two things to keep in
mind about DNA. First, a comparison of DNA markers may yield
something other than a "match" or "no match." Because of the way
DNA is inherited within a particular family group, DNA profiles of
individuals who are related to each other are more likely to contain
similarities than profiles of unrelated individuals. 5 It is therefore
possible to look in the database not just for the offender's profile, but
also look for profiles that may belong to a parent, child, or sibling of
the offender.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 29.
10. Id. at 34.
11. Id. at 45.
12. Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, supra note 3.
13. Bieber, supra note 7, at 35.
14. Id. at 36.
15. Forensics Science Service, Familial Searching November 2003, available at
<www.forensic.gov.uk/forensic-t/inside/ news/documents/Familialsearching.doc>.
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Second, a comparison based on DNA markers does not involve
the full array of information that DNA potentially holds about
someone. The portion of the genetic sequence that investigators use
for markers is commonly referred to as "junk DNA" because it does
not contain any otherwise useful information. 16 While the probative
value of "junk DNA" is debated, 7 DNA profiles used currently by
law enforcement reveal nothing about the person other than their
gender and what their DNA "fingerprint" looks like. However,
because information elsewhere in the genome can be used to predict
things like appearance, health, or behavior, the practice of using just a
small part the DNA sequence, even a part that does not reveal any of
those things, is controversial.
B. DNA Crime Databases
When a sample of DNA is collected from an offender or a crime
scene, numbers are used to represent the alleles present at the
indexing markers.'8 These numbers are then stored in a software
database, for reference and comparison to other files. What happens
to the actual tissue sample afterwards varies. Some jurisdictions
destroy it, but some keep it in storage. Because the sample contains
the entire array of DNA information, their subsequent status is a
contentious topic. 9 Under current profiling systems, however, the
genetic information in those samples is not available to law
enforcement investigators.
Criminal DNA databases are generally separated into two
pieces: an offender index and a crime scene index.2 ' The offenders
are all of the known people who have been required to submit a
sample. The crime scene index holds any traces of DNA found at
unsolved crime scenes. These are automatically compared against
each other on a regular basis, to see if a new offender in the system
matches a previously unsolved crime, or if a new crime sample
16. Christine Rosen, Liberty, Privacy, and DNA Databases, THE NEW ATLANTIS,
Spring 2003, at 41.
17. W. Wayt Gibbs, The Unseen Genome: Gems Among the Junk, SCIENTIFIC
AMERICAN, Nov. 2003, at 29. See also Unites States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813 (9th
Cir. 2004) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
18. Jean E. McEwen, DNA Data Banks, in GENETIC SECRETS, 233 (Mark
Rothstein ed., 1997).
19. Barry Steinhardt, Privacy and ForensicDNA Data Banks, in DNA AND THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, 173 at 190 (David Lazer ed., 2004).
20. Bieber, supra note 7, at 45.
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matches another crime sample already in the system. A match
between crime scene samples allows investigators to link seemingly
unrelated incidents to the same, unknown, perpetrator.
HI. Differences between the U.S. and U.K. DNA Programs
A. The Legal Structure
Like many government functions in the United States, the
national DNA database is a combination of state and federal
programs. All 50 states now have their own DNA legislation, and
each one maintains a state database in accordance with their state
laws, which often vary. The FBI has developed DNA comparison
software called CODIS (Combined DNA Identification System),
which they license to the states. Each state uses CODIS to upload
DNA profiles both to their own state database and the national
database.2' CODIS therefore provides a hierarchical system: profiles
originate at the state level, and then move up to the national index.22
This allows the state agencies to work within their own statutory
guidelines for administration and maintain their own database, but
also make comparisons against a national database of offenders. 3
The FBI is responsible for adding federal offenders to the database,
in accordance with federal law.
While every state is participating in this program, the use and
effectiveness of the programs vary significantly from state to state.
California has the largest state database, with 955,525 offender
profiles, and has generated over 5,000 "hits" so far.24 Virginia, which
was the first state to develop a database, has 258,816 profiles.25
Mississippi, on the other hand, has only 3,600 profiles in its database
and has only aided eight investigations.26 Often low utilization is a
21. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Combined DNA Index System (CODIS)
Home Page, Mission Statement and Background, <www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis
/program.htm>(visited Oct. 1, 2007).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Figures provided by the California Department of Justice, Oct. 2,2007.
25. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Combined DNA Index System (CODIS)
Home Page, Investigations Aided, Virginia, <www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/va.htm>
(visited Oct. 1, 2007).
26. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Combined DNA Index System (CODIS)
Home Page, Investigations Aided, Mississippi, <www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/ms.htm>
(visited Oct. 1, 2007).
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result of financial restraints, rather than lack of effective legislation.
Louisiana, for example, has one of the broadest statutory mandates
for collecting samples, but has only aided 586 investigations,27 due to
lack of available resources.'
The situation in the United Kingdom is very different. The
United Kingdom was the first nation to implement a DNA program,
establishing the National DNA Database (NDNAD) in 1995.29 The
NDNAD is operated by the Forensic Science Service, a governmentowned company that provides forensic services to the police
departments in England and Wales. ° There was no specific
legislation that set up the NDNAD; instead, a series of amendments
have been passed to the existing Police & Criminal Evidence Act.
The first of these amendments, passed in 1994, allowed DNA samples
to be collected and stored like fingerprints,3 and the subsequent
amendments have progressively broadened this power of the police.
The most recent amendment, passed in 2003, allows police to collect a
sample from anyone arrested for a recordable offense, regardless of
whether or not they are charged.32
In 2000, Prime Minister Tony Blair announced the DNA
Expansion Programme, a £240 million effort to include every known
offender in the database.33 This ambitious goal of having every active
criminal in the database, combined with an early start, put the United
Kingdom in a leadership position. For many years the NDNAD was
the largest DNA database in world, but recently the United States'
NDIS surpassed the NDNAD in size. As of July 2007, the U.S.
database had 4,766,390 offenders, 34 compared to 3,976,090 offenders

27. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Combined DNA Index System (CODIS)
Home Page, Investigations Aided, Louisiana, <www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/la.htm>
(visited Oct. 1, 2007).
28. David Lazer, Introduction: DNA and the Criminal Justice System, in DNA
and the Criminal Justice System, 8 (David Lazer ed., 2004).
29. The National DNA Database, supra note 3.
30. The
Forensic
Science
Service,
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
<www.forensic.gov.uk/forensict/inside/about/ general.htm> (visited Oct. 1, 2007).
31. Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, United Kingdom (1994).
32. Criminal Justice Act, United Kingdom (2003).
33. Forensic Science and Pathology Unit, DNA Expansion Programme 20002005: Reporting achievement,
October
2005,
at
3,
available
at
<www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/DNA Expansion.pdf>.
34. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Combined DNA Index System (CODIS)
Home Page, National DNA Index system <www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/national.htm>
(visited Oct. 1, 2007).
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in the U.K. database.35 But the United Kingdom still has the largest
percentage of population profiled. The United Kingdom currently
has 6.5% of its population in NDNDA,36 while the United States has
just 1.5% of its population in NDIS.37
B. Arrestee Sampling
The difference in percentage of population included in the two
databases is largely a result of different laws about who can be forced
to submit a sample. In the United States, the rules regarding sample
collection vary from state to state. Every state requires convicted sex
offenders to provide a DNA sample, and as of October 2007, 44 states
take samples from all convicted felons.38 Ten states are also taking
samples from persons convicted of certain misdemeanors, usually for
crimes related to sex or children.3 9
Where the U.S. scope of sampling differs most significantly from
the U.K. is in the area of arrestees. Arrestee sampling is the
collection of DNA from people who have been arrested, but not yet
convicted, and in some cases not even charged, with a crime.
Currently eight U.S. states, including California, have laws
authorizing arrestee sampling.' Some states wait for the indictment
and only sample sex offenders; California requires a sample from
anyone charged with a felony sex offense, murder, or manslaughter,
or anyone who attempts to commit those crimes.41 In 2009, this will
expand to arrests for all felonies.4 ' Because only a small number of
states have started arrestee sampling, the case law is very limited, and
35. Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, written answers for June. 20,
2007,
available
at
<www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm2006O7/cmhansrd/
cm070620/text/70620w0037.htm>.
36. Arithmetic based on size of database, supra note 35, and U.K. census data,
available at <www.census.gov/ipc/www/ idb/country/ukportal.html>.
37. Arithmetic based on size of database, supra note 34, and U.S. Census Data, at
<www.census.gov/> (visited Oct. 1, 2007).
38. National Conference of State Legislatures, State Laws on DNA Data Banks
Qualifying Offenses, <www.ncsl.org/programs/ cj/dnadatabanks.htm> (visited Oct. 1,
2007).
39. Id.
40. The other seven states are Alaska, Arizona, Louisiana, North Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. See Alaska Stat. § 44.41.035(b) (2007; Ariz. Rev.
Stat. § 13-610(o)(3) (2007); Ca. Pen. Code § 296(a)(2) (2007); La. Rev. Stat. § 15:602
(2004); N. D. Cent. Code. § 31-13-03 (2007); Tenn. Code. Ann. § 40-35-321 (2007);
Tex. Gov't Code § 411:1471(a)(2) (2004); and Va. Code. Ann. § 19.2-310.2:1 (2004).
41. Ca. Pen. Code § 296(a)(2).
42. Ca. Pen. Code § 296(a)(2)(c).
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the constitutionality of this practice is not clear. There are only two
U.S. cases that have addressed the issue, and they come to opposite
conclusions.
One is a Virginia case from September 2006, Anderson v.
Commonwealth.3 In 2001, Angel Anderson was arrested on a rape
charge." Because the Virginia statute allows collection of DNA from
someone arrested for rape, police took a sample from Anderson
immediately after the arrest." When this sample was entered into the
state database, it matched a crime scene sample from an unsolved
1991 rape. 6 Anderson was convicted of the earlier rape, but appealed
on grounds that the DNA taken after his 2001 arrest violated his
Fourth Amendment rights.' Specifically, he argued that taking the
sample was a "suspicionless search," unrelated to the crime for which
he had just been arrested.'
The court disagreed. 9 It referenced the established principle that
a search incident to arrest is permissible within the Fourth
Amendment, and that such a search may include an attempt to
identify the arrestee.5 0 It also pointed to the 1992 Fourth Circuit case
Jones v. Murray, which held the state's interest in the arrestee's
identity "is relevant not only to solving the crime for which the
suspect is arrested, but also for maintaining a permanent record to
solve other past and future crimes.""
The Minnesota Court of Appeals, however, reached the opposite
conclusion on this issue only a month later. In the October 2006 case
In re Welfare of C.T.L., C.T.L. was charged with assault and aiding
and abetting robbery.12 The state ordered C.T.L. to submit a DNA
sample, but he refused, arguing that the collection would violate his
Fourth Amendment rights. 3 The Court of Appeals agreed, holding
that arrestee sampling, with only a judicial determination of probable

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Anderson v. Commonwealth Of Virginia, 48 Va. App. 704 (Va. 2006).
Id. at 709.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 710.
Id.at 711.
Id. at 710.
Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306 (4th Cir. 1992).
In re C.T.L, 722 N.W.2d 484, 486 (Minn. 2006).
Id.
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cause, violates the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. '
The court stated that in this situation, the privacy interest of the
person who has been charged, but not convicted, is not outweighed by
the state's interest in taking a DNA sample.5
While arrestee sampling is an unsettled legal issue in the United
States, it is an accepted and widespread practice in the U.K. In 2001,
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act was amended to allow the
Forensic Science Service to retain a person's sample after an acquittal
or dismissal. 6 In 2003, another amendment authorized the police to
collect samples from anyone arrested for a recordable offense, before
a person is charged. 7 While the few U.S. states that permit arrestee
sampling do so only after a serious offense, the British are collecting
samples from people arrested for minor crimes, such as being drunk
in public or panhandling. 8
The retention of these samples without a conviction was
challenged in the English courts. Two cases were considered
together: one involved an 11-year-old boy charged with attempted
robbery, who was tried and acquitted. 9 The other involved a 38-yearold man who was charged with harassment by his partner. The
partner later dropped the charges.' In both cases, police retained the
DNA samples on file, pursuant to the 2001 amendment. The
plaintiffs argued that, because neither of them was ever convicted of a
crime, holding their DNA on file violated their privacy.6"
The Court of Appeal upheld the retention of the samples, on the
practical ground that a larger database is better. Lord Woolf wrote,
"[t]he larger the databank, the greater the value of the databank will
be in preventing crime."62 The case was appealed to the House of
Lords, which affirmed the Court of Appeal decision. Lord Steyn
wrote for the House of Lords, "[i]t is of paramount importance that
54. Id. at 492.
55. Id.
56. Criminal Justice and Police Act, United Kingdom (2001).
57. Criminal Justice Act, United Kingdom (2003).
58. GeneWatch UK, Police Retention of DNA: A briefing for Councillors and
Police Authorities in England and Wales, February 2007, available at
<www.genewatch.org/uploads/f03c6d66a9b354535738483clc3d49e4/Councillorsbrief0
7_2.pdf>.
59. Regina (S) v. Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police; Regina
(Marper) v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police, 1 WLR 3223 (2002).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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law enforcement agencies should take full advantage of the available
techniques of modern technology., 63 English courts seem, therefore,
to value the effectiveness of a large database over privacy concerns.
Why that is the case will be explored later in this note, but it is worth
noting here how a policy like arrestee sampling adds to effective law
enforcement.
Consider the 2001 Criminal Justice and Police Act, which
allowed the Home Office to keep DNA profiles after a case was
dropped or the accused was acquitted. After the law went into effect,
the police were able to keep 198,000 profiles in the database that
would have been destroyed under the old law. 64 During the next five
years, 7,591 of those profiles were matched to over 10,000 crimes,
including 88 murders and 116 rapes. 65 The 2003 amendment, allowing
arrestee sampling, is already showing similar results. Generally, 43%
of people arrested in the United Kingdom are not charged.' During
the years 2004 and 2005, samples taken from people who ended up
not being charged yielded 250 matches to other crime scenes,
including four murders, three rapes, and 98 burglaries.67
C. Familial Searching
In addition to taking samples from a broader range of people, the
British are also using their database in more powerful ways. A
notable example is the practice of "familial searching."
When
investigators do not find a perfect match in their database, they
sometimes look instead for a "partial" match: a profile that matches a
higher-than-average number of markers. Someone who shares alleles
at six or more markers may be a close relative of the actual suspect.
This can be a significant lead in a cold investigation, giving
investigators a place to start, or allowing them to focus on a particular
suspect, saving time and resources.
The British started using familial searching in 2002. 8 Since then,
the Home Office has used the technique in 20 cases and solved five of
them, including the rape and murder of an 86-year-old woman. 69 The

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

South Yorkshire Police, supra note 56, at 3223.
Forensic Science and Pathology Unit, supra note 30, at 6.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Forensic Science Service, Fact Sheet, FamilialSearching,Feb. 2005.
Forensic Science and Pathology Unit, supra note 30, at 6.
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prosecution of Craig Harman is representative. ° In March of 2003,
someone threw a brick off a bridge that ran over a road. It went
through a car windshield, causing the driver to suffer a fatal heart
attack. There were no witnesses, but the offender left a little of his
own blood on the brick. There was no match in NDNAD, but police
checked for partial matches and found a close relative, who led them
to Harman. When confronted, he confessed, and is now serving a sixyear sentence for manslaughter.
This method is used very rarely in the United States
Massachusetts and New York are the only states that have statutes
that explicitly allow familial searching, although most states do not
have a law prohibiting the practice. In Virginia, the laboratories are
authorized to turn over "very, very close matches,, 73 but are not
permitted to turn over anything short of that, despite a strong
suggestion of relation. 4 In Massachusetts, the police do not usc the
technique, even though it is legal, because they lack the resources. 75
North Carolina may have the only successful familial search in
the United States at this point. In 2002, a DNA test proved that the
wrong man was in prison for a 1984 rape and murder. Police
compared the original crime scene sample against their database, and,
although they did not find a match, they did find someone who
matched at eight of the thirteen markers. Investigators then focused
on that man's brother; they analyzed a cigarette butt he dropped, and
DNA on the cigarette matched the crime sample perfectly. The man
confessed and is now serving a life term in prison.76
This example is one of a kind, however. Most states are not
pursuing familial searching right now, despite the absence of any
explicit prohibition against it. There may be a variety of reasons for
this. Familial searching often requires substantial resources, because

70. Forensic Science Service Annual Report, 2004-05, available at
<www.forensic.gov.uk/forensic-t/inside/about/ docs/04_05.pdf >.
71. Id.
72. Richard Willing, Suspects get snared by a relative's DNA, USA TODAY, June
7, 2005, <www.usatoday.com/news/nation/ 2005-06-07-dna-cover x.htm> (visited Oct.
1, 2007).
73. Id.
74. Gareth Cook, Near match of DNA could lead police to more suspects, THE
BOSTON GLOBE, May 12, 2006, <www.boston.com/news/ nation/articles/2006/05/12/
nearmatch of dna couldlead-police-tomoresuspects/> (visited Oct. 1, 2007).
75. Id.
76. Willing, supra note 69.
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a partial match may or may not be a relative of the target.
Investigators must first determine if the person is a relative, and then
investigate any connections between his family members and the
crime. This can be an expensive, and fruitless, process. But familial
searching can in some situations be helpful, depending on the genetic
profiles involved and the nature of the investigation. The fact that
this method goes almost entirely unused in the United States right
now suggests that cost is not the only barrier, and that the Fourth
Amendment is a potential barrier as well.
The collection of DNA samples implicates the Fourth
Amendment because the blood extraction constitutes a search.77
Generally, the Fourth Amendment requires that a search be
supported by some reasonable suspicion that an individual has
committed a crime." But courts have also found many situations that
allow for a "suspicionless search." Some of these apply to exempted
areas, such as airports and border crossings, and some of them qualify
as "special needs."79 Examples of special needs have been highway

sobriety check points 8° and random, suspicionless drug testing.8 But
the ultimate issue with any warrantless search is whether it is
"reasonable," because the Constitution only protects citizens against
unreasonable searches.8 And the reasonableness of a search is
determined by balancing the state interest involved against the degree
of intrusion on the citizen's privacy.83
The U.S. courts of appeals are unanimous that DNA collection
statutes are constitutional, but they are split as to whether the issue
falls under special needs analysis or the traditional balancing test.
The Second, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits apply a balancing test only
after finding the statute serves some special government needy. The
Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits apply the traditional

77. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Assoc, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
78. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
79. U.S. v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 822-823 (9th Cir. 2004).
80. Michigan v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
81. Board of Education v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
82. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619.
83. Id. at 618.
84. See Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1999) (upholding Connecticut DNA
statute); Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2004) (upholding Wisconsin DNA
statute); United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2003) (upholding the DNA
Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000).
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balancing test without finding a special need.8
Despite these
divergent analytic approaches, the constitutionality of DNA
collection is always ultimately a balance between the state interest
and the privacy interest. Common considerations that courts weigh in
the balance are the minimally invasive nature of collecting blood
samples,6 the offender's reduced expectation of privacy,' the strong
state interest in public safety," and the exceptional reliability of DNA
evidence for identification.89
The issue of whether familial searching would alter that balance
has never come before a U.S. court, but it seems possible that it could
affect the constitutionality of a DNA database program. Some courts
have identified the offender's reduced expectation of privacy as one
of the factors in the balancing test, but a familial search begins to
implicate the privacy rights of the relative, and the constitutional
significance of that is unknown right now. Some states may therefore
be reluctant to pursue familial searching because doing so could upset
the constitutional status of their investigation.
Arrestee sampling and familial searching are two prominent
examples of how these programs differ in the United States and the
United Kingdom, but there are others. DNA "dragnets" are also
more common in the United Kingdom. This is a police tactic of
encouraging all members of a community to provide DNA samples to
aid an ongoing investigation, without suspicion of any one person.
These occur in both countries, but are more common and accepted in
the United Kingdom. °
All of these examples demonstrate that the U.S. and U.K. legal
regimes are evolving differently, both in regard to whose data is in the
database, and what can be done with the information once it is there.

85. See Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992) (upholding Virginia DNA
statute); Groceman v. United States, 354 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2004) (upholding the
DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000); United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d
813 (9th Cir., 2004) (en banc, five judges endorsing the reasonableness standard; one,
the special needs exception; and five dissenting); Padgett v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273
(11th Cir. 2005).
86. United States v. Sczubelek, 255 F. Supp. 2d 315,323 (D. Del. 2003).
87. Id.
88. Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 78 (2d Cir. 1999).
89. Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2004).
90. Aaron P. Stevens, Arresting Crime: Expanding the Scope of DNA Databases
in America, 79 TEX. L. REV. 921, 956 (2001).

Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 31:1

IV. Why the Law Is Evolving Differently
A. The Fourth Amendment
Clearly a large factor in these differing practices is the Fourth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The British are legislating
DNA collection programs without a comparable constitutional
constraint. But the Fourth Amendment does not fully explain the
difference. There has never been a U.S. court case on familial
searching, let alone a case that held that it violates the Fourth
Amendment. Arrestee sampling is just starting to be discussed in the
courts, but several states are already doing it successfully.
Nonetheless, most states are not using either of these practices.
While this may be attributable in part to disparities of state resources,
it may also reflect the fundamentally different understanding of
privacy in the United States and the United Kingdom. Before
looking at our understandings of privacy, it is worth considering what
about DNA databases makes privacy a controversial issue.
B. Privacy Concerns
Privacy is implicated by DNA evidence in several ways. First,
there is the concern over the vast amount of information that DNA
contains about a person. DNA may function in some ways like a
fingerprint, but of course it is much more than that. Precisely what a
person's DNA reveals about him is debated, but it certainly includes
genetic defects, predisposition to disease and possibly the propensity
to engage in certain behavior.9" Proponents of DNA databases point
out that the current profiling systems do no use any of that
information. Systems like CODIS only include numbers generated
from alleles in "junk DNA," pieces of the genome that are useful for
identification but nothing else.
Some privacy advocates are not assuaged by that response. They
point to research that indicates this so-called "junk" DNA may in fact
contain useful genetic information. 9 Furthermore, the state and
federal laws that authorize the collection of DNA generally do not
require that tissue samples be destroyed after the numerical profile is
created.93 The state is often keeping a complete genetic sample of
91. Kincade, supra note 17, at 850.
92. Gibbs, supra note 17, at 29. See also Steinhardt, supra note 19, at 173.
93. Steinhardt, supra note 19, at 190.
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these people, even if it is not using it. But current law enforcement
methods of DNA comparison and investigation do not involve any of
this genetic information. DNA collection statutes in both the United
States and United Kingdom only allow investigators to look at
numeric representations of the markers for the sole purpose of
solving crimes. So the question of what other information may be
available in a tissue sample, or in "junk" regions of the genome is
largely irrelevant.
Regardless of how well genetic privacy is being maintained
today, another common concern is how the government might use
this genetic information in the future. In March of 2000, the House
Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime held hearings regarding CODIS
and the use of DNA databases in criminal investigations. Barry
Steinhardt, who is the Director of the Technology and Liberty
Program at the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), testified on
behalf of the ACLU and described one of the organization's concerns
about DNA database programs: "While a DNA data bank for
criminal identification purposes may have legitimate uses, I am
skeptical that we can hold the line and ward off the temptation to
expand its use to non-forensic purposes." 94 Steinhardt pointed the
Subcommittee to two previous examples of what he called "function
creep" in other government database programs. One was social
security numbers, which the government stated in the 1930s would
only be used to facilitate a new retirement program, and the other
was census records, which were used during World War II to round
up Japanese Americans for internment camps, despite their original,
benign, statistical purpose. 95
It should be noted that most of these privacy concerns involve
future, hypothetical scenarios. In their current implementations,
DNA database programs do not reveal anything about the subjects
other than their gender. Proponents of these databases argue that
DNA is a uniquely powerful investigative tool, which should not be
underutilized because of theoretical concerns about possible future
use or misuse. As their current use is permitted narrowly by statute,
94. Violent Offender DNA Identification Act of 1999, DNA Backlog Elimination
Act and Convicted Offender DNA Index System Support Act: Hearingon H.R. 2810,
H.R. 3087, and H.R. 3375 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary,106th Cong. 178 (2000) (prepared testimony of Barry Steinhardt, Associate
Director, American Civil Liberties Union), available at <http://commdocs.house.gov/
committees/judiciary/hju65302.000/hju65302_0.htm>.
95. Id.
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any new use would have to be legislated as well.
C. Different Legal and Cultural Understandings of Privacy
Privacy has become an integral part of American constitutional
rights, despite the absence of the word "privacy" anywhere in the text
of the Constitution. While the contours of this right are debated, it
exists firmly in at least two places. One is the freedom under the
Fourth Amendment to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures, which turns on the "expectation of privacy" that Justice
Harlan famously described in his concurrence in Katz v. United
States.96 The other is the right to personal autonomy, which began in
the contraception case Griswold v. Connecticut,97 wound its way
through the abortion cases, 98 and recently reappeared in the sodomy
law case of Lawrence v. Texas.99
A right to privacy in the United Kingdom, on the other hand, is a
very recent idea, emerging only in the last 10 years. The English Bill
of Rights, passed by Parliament in 1689, included a few of the ideas in
the American Bill of Rights, such as due process and freedom from
cruel and unusual punishment."° But the act was really an assertion
of parliamentary rights against the King, rather than an assertion of
individual rights against Parliament."1 For most of modern history,
the concept of individual rights simply did not exist in England.' °
Shortly after World War II, however, the idea of a right to
privacy began to emerge in Europe. As a response to the lessons of
Nazi Germany, several European nations, including the United
Kingdom, passed the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) 3 Among other basic rights, the Convention acknowledged
a "respect for... private and family life."'" But unlike firm rights

96. Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347,361 (1967).
97. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
98. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992).
99. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
100. Bill of Rights, United Kingdom (1689).
101. Geoffrey Marshall, The United Kingdom Human Rights Act, 1998, in
DEFINING THE FIELD OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,

107 (Vicki Jackson

and Mark Tushnet eds., 2002).

102. Id.
103. ANN

LYON, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM,

443 (2003).

104. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Article 8 (1950).
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like freedom of thought and religion, the right to privacy was cast in
flexible terms. Under the ECHR, the right to a private life could be
limited in the interests of "national security, public safety or... the
prevention of disorder or crime."1 5 Furthermore, this right was not
even enforceable in British courts.
This changed, however, in 1998, when the newly elected Labour
Party passed the Human Rights Act, making the European
Convention rights enforceable in U.K. Courts. Geoffrey Marshall, a
British Constitutional law scholar, describes the Human Rights Act as
the first attempt at a modern bill of rights for U.K. subjects.' °6 But it
is important to note how this Act relates to other British laws. Unlike
the U.S. Bill of Rights, which can be used to declare a law
unconstitutional, the U.K. Human Rights Act is only a guide for
interpreting ambiguous legislation. Courts are not authorized by the
Act to strike down legislation that conflicts with an individual right;
instead they are encouraged to interpret laws, when possible, to
accommodate its principles 3 7 When a statute conflicts with the
Human Rights Act, but is clear in its meaning, it must be upheld.
This means that British subjects lack a meaningful remedy when
the government invades their privacy. A subject who convinces a
court that a British law violates her rights is not entitled to an
automatic reversal of the law. All the court can do, under the Human
Rights Act, is make a declaration that the law is "incompatible" with
her rights.'08 It is then left up to the government minister to do
something about that, or not. This is small vindication for a successful
plaintiff.
A look at recent cases confirms this. In the 1991 case Kaye v.
Robertson, journalists went into the hospital room of a famous
television actor who was recovering from a severe head injury.
They ignored staff requests to leave and took photographs of the
actor, who was incoherent at the time. The courts, while disgusted by
the behavior of the reporters, lamented the lack of any remedy."' In
the court's opinion, Lord Justice Glidewell stated: "It is well known

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Marshall, supra note 101, at 107.
Id.
Id. at 113.
Kaye v. Robertson, F.S.R. 62 (1991).
Id.
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that in English law there is no right to privacy.'"" Lord Justice
Bingham agreed, stating "the case highlights, yet again, the failure of
[British law] to protect
in an effective way the personal privacy of
2
individual citizens.""

But a more recent case shows that the Human Rights Act is
starting to change the landscape. In 2001, Michael Douglas and
Catherine Zeta-Jones sued the magazine Hello over unauthorized
photos of their wedding that appeared in the magazine." 3 Their
claims included one for breach of privacy, which was largely a test
case for the new privacy protections of the HRA. And indeed, the
court recognized, for the first time, a duty under the HRA to protect
the privacy of an individual against the actions of another person."'
While this is a significant development for British privacy rights,
it should be noted that this applies only to horizontal claims between
private parties,"5 which has limited implications for challenging DNA
collection laws. In theory, a British subject could bring a claim
against the Forensic Science Service, the corporation that does the
testing for the Home Office. But the right to privacy, as described in
the European Convention, can be limited for "the prevention.., of
crime. '' 116 And there is no legal avenue for a subject to have any
provision of evidence law invalidated on privacy grounds. This stands
in stark contrast to the system in the United States, where any
defendant can challenge existing legislation under the Fourth or
Fourteenth Amendments.
The divergent legal status of privacy rights in the United States
and United Kingdom does not fully explain our varied approaches to
DNA databases, however, for at least two reasons. First, while
British subjects lack a direct means of challenging the laws as privacy
violations, they still live in a representative democracy. The Home
Office has been pursing aggressive DNA collection for 13 years; if
these tactics violated a deep sense of privacy held by a majority of the
population, we would be seeing a strong attempt to limit them
through political channels. Second, as noted earlier, the United
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Id.
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States is barely pursuing arrestee sampling and familial searching,
despite any case law that prohibits it.
It may be that the British are more aggressive with their DNA
programs, and the Americans more restrained, because aside from
our legal understandings of privacy, our cultures fundamentally value
privacy differently. This is a difficult quality to measure objectively,
but evidence is frequently seen in the rhetoric of this debate, on both
sides. Christopher Asplen, Executive Director of the National
Commission on the Future of DNA Evidence, has said "[The British]
system makes a tremendous amount of sense.., but in the United
States we have a different perspective on privacy and on the extent to
which we would be willing to depend on a database.". 7 Baroness
Helena Kennedy, Chair of the U.K. Human Genetics Commission,
described the British reaction this way at a 2002 meeting of the U.S.
President's Council on Bioethics: "We are a rather passive, gentle
nation it seems, because nobody has become particularly alarmed
enough to make enough of an issue of this. ' .. The psychological
character of the British people is beyond the scope of this paper and
the expertise of this author (as, for that matter, is the psychological
character of Americans), but the point is that the difference between
U.S. and U.K. DNA database programs is a product of more than just
the structure of our constitutions and privacy laws.
Consider the use of closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras in
the United Kingdom for fighting crime and terrorism. The United
Kingdom is the world leader in the use of public surveillance devices,
particularly CCTV cameras."9 With over 2.5 million CCTV cameras
in public places, the United Kingdom captures the average British
subject on camera 300 times a day. 2 Many of the CCTV cameras in
the United Kingdom are able to compare the captured images against

117. Nicholas Wade, F.B.I Set To Open Its DNA Database For Fighting Crime,
THE NEW YORK TIMES, October 12, 1998.

118. Transcript of US President's Council on Bioethics Meeting, Oct. 18, 2002,
Session Five, available at <www.bioethics.gov/transcripts/oct02/session5.html>
(visited Oct. 1, 2007).
119. Laura K. Donohue, Criminal Law: Anglo-American Privacy And
Surveillance, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1059 at 1156 (2006).
See also
Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance Of Public PlacesAnd The
Right To Anonymity, 72 Miss. L.J. 213 at 222 (2002) (referring to Great Britain as
"the champion of CCTV surveillance").
120. Jane Wakefield, Watching your every move, BBC NEWS ONLINE, February 7,
2002, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 2/hi/science/nature/1789157.stm>.
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a database of faces of people who are being sought by the police.121
The United States, on the other hand, is far behind the United
Kingdom in public video surveillance and facial recognition
technology.' 22 It seems unlikely, however, that the respective legal
understandings of privacy explain this disparity. Surveillance of
public places with CCTV cameras is clearly legal in the United States,
because the technology is in use in several American cities, albeit on a
smaller scale than in the United Kingdom. 23 Yet Americans have
been unwilling to accept public surveillance to the same degree as the
British, despite the fact that fighting terrorism is a high priority for
both countries.
There appears to be a general willingness among British subjects
to sacrifice personal privacy in the interest of state security that
Americans simply do not share, regardless of whether the security
measure is constitutional. This is apparent not only in the current use
of technologies like CCTV cameras and DNA databases, but also in
the political discourse about the future of these programs. In October
2006, Prime Minister Tony Blair began calling for a DNA database
profile of every British subject. 124 It seems unimaginable that a
candidate in the 2008 American presidential race would suggest such
a thing.
V. Conclusion
The laws in this area are changing rapidly, and the coming years
will likely show significant changes on both sides of the Atlantic.
Arrestee sampling and familial searching are just getting started in
the United States, and the British are only beginning to experiment
with their newly enforceable privacy rights. But the differences that
exist in our DNA database programs so far reveal more than the
structure of our respective constitutions. The debate whether law
shapes culture or culture shapes law is an old one, but it remains clear
that Americans and British have very different cultural notions about

121. Donahue, supra note 119, at 1185. See also Joyce W. Luk, Identifying
Terrorists: Privacy Rights in the United States and United Kingdom, 25 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 223 at 229 (2002).
122. Luk, supra note 121, at 256.
123. Donahue, supra note 119, at 1188.
124. George Jones, DNA database 'shouldinclude all',
TELEGRAPH, October 24, 2006, <www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main. jhtml?xml=/news/
2006/10/24/ndna24.xml>.
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privacy, and about the extent to which they will give up their privacy
for effective law enforcement. And this should not come as a
surprise, given our respective histories. The American Constitution
was explicitly built to differ from the British model, and we continue
to see the implications of that departure, even in cutting-edge law
enforcement technologies of the 21st century.
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